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Economic Rationale, Trade Impact and Extent of 
Antidumping – A Case Study of Pakistan 
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Abstract 
This paper has analyzed the economic and political justification, 
trade impact and extent of antidumping measures initiated by Pakistan. 
Screening models for anti-predatory behaviour, Herfindahl-Hireshmann 
Index (HHI) for concentration and descriptive statistical measures are 
used to test the antidumping (AD) behaviour. The results are consistent 
with the earlier literature that AD duties have both a trade reduction 
and diversion effect. It is evident from the results in half of the cases 
studied that an economic rationale has been followed in the application 
of AD duties in Pakistan. Although the number of AD cases is limited, 
Pakistan has emerged as one of the intensive users of AD, relative to its 
total import share. It is also evident from the fact that intensive use of 
AD reduces trade and increases trade barriers, similarly, trade diversion 
reduces the chances of trade reduction. The key message emerging from 
this research is that trade diversion persists and in some cases trade 
diversion is substantial and it offsets the effect of AD measures on named 
countries to the benefit of non-named countries. 
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Introduction 
Large-scale recourse18 to antidumping19 (AD) has raised fears among 
researchers, analysts and specialists of its use as a protectionist measure, e.g. 
Viner (1923), Barcelo (1971), Trebilock and Quinn (1979), Leclerc (1999). 
While some have raised questions about the ambiguities regarding AD’s 
effects on trade, others have questioned the economic rationale behind such 
actions. Many scholars suggest that AD measures are inefficient and do not 
conform to the economic explanation of protection, e.g. Tharakan and 
Waelbroeck (1994), Tharakan (1995). On the other hand, some economists 
also argue that charging two or more prices for a similar product in two or 
more markets separated by tariffs, transport costs and technical standards is 
economically rational in many situations, e.g. Viner (1923), Willig (1998), 
Messerlin and Tharakan (1999), or that producers keep prices low 
strategically when they introduce a product in a new market to create 
demand for it (Boltuck, 1991). In addition, if a firm produces what is called 
‘learning by doing’ products (Deardorff, 1993) then the firm, by charging 
lower prices in foreign markets, will gain in experience as well as increase 
their sales revenue. 
The most frequently offered economic justification for antidumping 
laws is that these laws protect competition and consumers. For most 
scholars, the consumer welfare standard is the main measure of economic 
efficiency, which suggests that antidumping laws are created to prevent 
predatory pricing. Conversely, Stiglitz (1997) considered that there is 
essentially no connection between national welfare considerations and AD 
protection; it is simply a strategy to protect the domestic industry. 
Therefore, strategic trade policy is the other protection-based justification 
for the imposition of AD duties, as a measure against ‘strategic dumping’ 
(Willig, 1998). Strategic trade policy is the investment by the dumping 
country or firm to occupy a major market share to generate externalities, 
                                                          
18 The number of antidumping petitions increased very rapidly into the hundreds after the 
implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 which 
entered into force on January 1995. From 1980-85 four user, US, EU, Australia, Canada, 
accounted for more than 99% of all filings (Finger, 1993).  Prior to 1988 none of the 
developing countries filed any cases. Total AD initiations by all the AD users in 1995 
were 157, then increased to 364 in 2001 and reached 191 in 2005. This surge of AD 
activity has been noticed on face value of AD petition numbers without taking into 
consideration the economic rationale. 
19 Broadly speaking a product is said to have been dumped if it is introduced into the 
commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the product and it 
causes/threaten material injury to an established industry of the importing country 
(Aggarwal, 2002). Antidumping duties are imposed against the dumped products by the 
host country. 
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e.g. Katrak (1977), Svedberg (1979). In theory, a role for strategic trade 
policy emerges in two situations: imperfect competition and economies of 
scale in production. 
For the legal imposition of AD duties, three basic conditions need 
to be satisfied: first, the existence of a dumping margin must be 
established; second, the material injury to concerned domestic industries 
must be shown; and third, the causal relationship between dumped 
imports and material injury to domestic industries must be demonstrated 
(Lee-Mah, 2003). Difficulties arise when firms exercise market power. In 
such instances, government intervention can be justified. The problem 
arises because the instruments that are usually available to a government 
to discipline a domestic firm, such as anti-trust regulation, are not 
effective in the case of foreign-based enterprises20. In the absence of 
antitrust instruments, the government resorts to other alternatives. A 
resurrection of trade barriers is a possibility. Another option is the use of 
antidumping policies, which allow governments to impose duties whenever 
goods are sold in export markets at less than their ‘fair value’. These 
policies, in essence, prevent the country’s (firms) attempts at price 
discrimination between markets, which could lead to material injury of 
the domestic industry. Given the international dimension, the advantage 
of AD is that it does not require any supranational powers. The 
disadvantage of AD policies is that these policies do not fully address the 
problem of market power and indeed often induce more distortions in the 
market than they resolve, and are often captured by special interest 
groups. It is generally believed that the negative impact of AD outweigh 
the positive ones. Therefore, a major part of this paper is an investigation 
of the economic motives behind AD. 
It is possible that dominant domestic producers in concentrated 
industries use AD laws to protect themselves from foreign competition. This 
‘small firm’ argument is supported by researchers, yet they are unable to 
establish that concentrated industries are more likely to gain favourable 
decisions, e.g. Finger et al. (1982). Oligopolists may use their lobbying 
power effectively to obtain protection from import competition, see e.g. 
Tharakan (1994), Tharakan and Waelbroeck (1994) and Hutton and 
Trebilcock (1990). Similarly, politics play a significant role in the widespread 
use of AD [Hansen and Prusa, (1996, 1997) Agarwal, (2002)], while another 
                                                          
20 The exporting country could, of course, also use anti-trust policies to force its firms to 
behave more competitively in foreign markets, but it frequently is not in the interest of 
the nation to do so (Levinsohn, 1996). 
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study (Finger et al. 1982) found no evidence of political influence on the 
widespread use of AD.  
One way to make a sense of AD use is to observe the pattern of its 
use among the countries. The worldwide explosion in the use of AD duties 
has been widely documented e.g. Blonigen and Prusa, (2003), Miranda, 
Torres, and Ruiz (1998) and Messerlin (1989). If, for no other reason, the 
widespread use of AD makes it an important research topic. One factor 
behind the rise of antidumping protection could be that countries are 
engaged in retaliatory mini-trade wars (Prusa and Skeath, 2002). Similarly, 
cumulation (which is defined as the practice of aggregating over the 
exports of several countries) has a super additive effect on the AD surge, 
see e.g. Tharakan, Greenway, and Tharakan (1998), while increasingly the 
weak standard of AD is another factor in AD proliferation (Hansen and 
Prusa, 1995), Miranda, Torres, and Ruiz (1998) Finger, Ng, and Wangchuk 
(2000). Such indiscriminate use of AD will negatively affect the expected 
positive outcomes of liberalized trade under the WTO regime. AD 
measures can be justified as a response to unfair import competition. But 
the recent surge in AD investigations can clearly not be explained by an 
increase in unfair trading practices alone. One of the major concerns for 
international firms is also the growing importance of the so-called 
‘technical track’ of trade policy (Finger, 1993). It increasingly appears that 
many companies no longer seek competitive victory in the fields of 
commerce and trade but in the halls of justice and regulators. 
According to the review of the empirical work on the impact of AD 
measures (Blonigen and Prusa, 2003), most of the empirical studies conclude 
for USA and EU data, that it significantly reduces imports from named-
countries, see e.g. Staiger and Wolak (1994), Prusa (1997), Messerlin (1989), 
and Brenton (2001). As a result, AD sometimes causes trade diversion rather 
than its reduction, as its effects depend on a number of factors such as: 
concentration of industries, extent of injury and margin of dumping. For 
example, in case of severe injury, antidumping duties would be higher, 
which might be a potential threat to exports of dumping firms, but in the 
case of minor injury, the AD duty would be small and would likely not pose 
any threat to other firms/countries that would wish to increase their 
exports. 
Consequently, the objectives of this study are: i) to find out the 
economic rationale behind the use of AD, and whether it disciplines the 
behaviour of imperfectly competitive firms in international markets or not. 
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ii) To examine the use of AD by Pakistan21. iii) To check the AD 
measures/effects on trade reduction/diversion patterns.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the 
methodology, hypothesis, variables and data, Section III-discusses the results, 
and finally Section IV concludes with policy recommendations.  
II. Methodology, Hypothesis Variables and Data 
The methodology used in this paper is based mostly on statistical 
and descriptive techniques, but we have also used models for anti-
predatory behaviour, such as the screening method, which has the 
advantage of relying exclusively on published information. The presence of 
predatory behaviour will provide an economic justification for 
antidumping. Five screen tests are conducted; the first screen test is based 
on the foreign firm having a forecasted market share of 40 percent in 
Pakistan. If the market share is more than 40 percent, it would indicate 
predatory behaviour of a foreign firm. The second screen test consists of 
eliminating the cases where antidumping duties are not imposed. The 
third screen test takes into account the number of countries involved in a 
given case. If the number of countries is more than four, then the chance 
of collusion diminishes. The fourth screen test aims at taking into account 
another aspect of the cost of colluding: the numbers of firms involved in a 
given case. If the number of firms involved in a case is more than eight 
then the chances of collusion are low. The fifth screen test considers 
foreign firm market shares and the number of competitors of the domestic 
industry. Low foreign firm share and multiple competitors does not 
suggest the existence of a non-competitive market favourable to predatory 
behaviour. These screen tests are widely used in the ‘EC contingent 
protection of antidumping instruments’22, see e.g. also Bourgeioes and 
Messerline (1998). 
                                                          
21 In Pakistan, antidumping investigations are carried out by the government agencies 
(National Tariff Commission working under the Ministry of Commerce). An 
investigation is normally initiated by means of an application filed by or on behalf of a 
domestic industry, which must include evidence of dumping, injury and a causal 
connection between the two. The investigation determines whether or not there has been 
dumping, which exists where the export price is below normal value. Normal value may 
be based on prices of sales to third countries, or constructed value, which is cost of 
production plus profit, where home market sales is not available or cannot be used. The 
investigation also determines whether the dumped imports have caused or threaten to 
cause material injury to a domestic industry producing the like product.  
22 www.iie.com/publications/chapters_preview/102/appbiie2733.pdf, see pg. 355. 
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We analyzed the composition of foreign firms using the Herfindahl-
Hireshmann Index (HHI). For the ‘Retaliation’ and ‘Strategic Industry’23 
arguments, we used descriptive analyses of antidumping cases, the number 
of producers, the number of petitioners and their market shares, taken as 
variables for Pakistan and against Pakistan. Case by case analysis is presented 
in Appendix-A. 
The Herfindhal-Hirschman concentration index (HHI or H) is used to 
measure the concentration in import. It is given by:  
 H = si2  
where     si = mi/M     
where mi is the imports or production of firm i and M is total imports or 
production (i.e. M=imi). Thus, si is the share of import or production of 
firm i on total import production.  
Spread of Antidumping 
The weighted Antidumping Intensity Index (ADI) is used, which 
measures the intensity of AD for a country that is accused of dumping 
relative to its export or user of antidumping relative to its import 
performance. The ADI for a country (or region) i can be calculated as 
follows:  
 ADIi = Ii
t, t+n / Iw
t, t+n   ) / (Mi
t,t+ n / Mw
, t, t+n) 
Where Ii
t, t+n is the number of AD investigations/measures against country i 
(or product, region) between years t and t+n; Iw
t, t+n is the total number of 
investigations/measures conducted globally in years t and t+n; Mi
t,t+n is the 
value of exports/imports of a country i between years t and t+n; and M w
t, t+n 
stands for world export/import.  
If the index value is above unity, then the country or region is 
intensively affected by (or has used) AD actions relative to its share in global 
export (import) markets. AD action is considered proportional if the index is 
at unity, while less than unity means that the country is lightly affected by 
AD. The trade-weighted ADI index can be applied to the initiation of 
investigations as well as to definitive measures. 
                                                          
23 Dominant domestic producer and oligopolists may use their lobbying power effectively 
to obtain protection from import competition. 
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Statistical Test for Trade Impact 
Mean-differences tests on imports before and after AD is used to 
calculate the trade impact of AD.  
Data 
A total of six AD cases, which were successfully concluded in 
Pakistan before December 2005, are used for analysis. This is a small 
sample, but it varies in terms of the representation of different sectors. 
Three out of six cases are from the chemical industry, two are from the 
rubber and plastic industry and one case is from the base metal industry. 
The data regarding the number of firms and countries which were 
investigated, the dumping margin, antidumping duties and the negative or 
affirmative decisions in the antidumping cases were collected from the non-
confidential reports published by the National Tariff Commission, 
Government of Pakistan. 
Export and import data of some selected countries were used to 
measure the intensity. Export data at f.o.b and import data at c.i.f was 
gathered from the International Financial Statistics, IMF. PRAL (Pakistan 
Revenue Automation Limited) provides data on the import of investigated 
products into Pakistan.  
Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses are tested. 
1. Antidumping measures in Pakistan are anti-predatory in nature.  
2. ‘Retaliation’ and ‘Strategic industry’ arguments are the real reasons 
for imposing AD.  
3. Concentrated domestic industries are more likely to gain favorable 
antidumping decisions. 
4. Import concentration can be linked to material injury and 
antidumping duties reduces import concentration. 
5. Pakistan is more intensive on average in terms of antidumping 
measures.  
6. The sample mean of imports after AD duty  sample mean of import 
before AD duty. 
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7. Trade diverts from the named countries to non-named countries.  
III. Results 
Three rationales for the economic justification of AD, i.e. ‘Anti-
predation’, ‘Political Economy’ and ‘Strategic Trade Industry’ are tested in 
this analysis. We quantify the use of Pakistan’s AD intensity as a parameter 
of spread. The study also considers whether AD use leads to overall import 
reduction and sometimes import diversion.  
Antidumping and Predation 
Five simple screening tests are used to tackle the question of 
whether antidumping cases are anti-predation cases or not. The results in 
Table-I suggest that the AD cases in Pakistan do not address predation issues 
at least in three cases. Passing of each test is represented by 1 and in case of 
failure by 0. For the anti-predatory nature it is necessary for the 
antidumping case to pass all the five tests: That an antidumping case results 
into a positive outcome, forecasted market share is above 40 percent, 
numbers of countries are below four and number of firms below eight. 
However, it is not certain whether the import market is equally shared by 
the firms and countries. For this, four years combined index of HHI is used 
to conduct the fifth test. Minimum HHI is based on the assumption that the 
aggregate market share for the foreign firm is split equally among them. 
Maximum HHI is based on the assumption that all foreign firms except one 
have the market share close to zero. HHI value for a case above or equal to 
the threshold level of 0.18 is indicated in the Table by 1, which shows 
severe concentration. Three out of four cases shows HHI value more than 
0.18, while HHI is less than the threshold level in one case, that is 
‘Tinplate’ imported from South Africa. Therefore, this case has been 
dropped from the anti-predation test. Only three cases out of six successfully 
completed the screen tests, which show that almost half of AD cases in 
Pakistan cannot be proven to address competition. The result shown in 
Table-1 is similar to what has been found for US AD cases (Shin 1997). The 
anti-predation test process demonstrates the acquisition of a large market 
share by the importer; the atleast capacity exists to exercise and keep 
market power, once a large market share is obtained. 
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Table-I: Results of Screening Test 
HS code Product 
Name 
Industry Test.1* T.2** T.3*** T. 4**** T.5***** 
7210.1200 Tinplate Base 
Metal  
1 1 
 
1 1 0 (drop) 
2905.4400 & 
3824.6000 
Sorbitol 70% 
solution  
Chemical 1 1 
 
1 1 1 
2915.2100 Glacial Acetic 
Acid 
Chemical 1 1 1 1 1 
5501.3000 Acrylic Tow 
(AT) 
Rubber 
plastic  
1 1 
 
1 1 1 
3904.1000 PVC Resin 
(PVCR) 
Rubber 
plastic 
1 0 (drop) 
 
- - - 
3909.1010 UFMC Chemical 1 0 (drop) - - - 
*Passing Screen No.1  40 percent market share = 1, otherwise=0 
(Affirmative or negative duty). 
** The cases in which antidumping duties are imposed = 1, otherwise=0. 
*** Less than four countries investigated = 1, otherwise=0. 
**** Less than 8 firms investigated= 1, otherwise =0. 
*****HHI (imp)  0.1818 as high concentration = 1, otherwise=0 
Antidumping and Political Economy 
Table-2 demonstrates that five out of six petitioners are the sole 
producers in the domestic market while the sixth petitioner holds 83 
percent of domestic production. Clearly, the petitioners are the dominant 
producers in their industry. 
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Table-2: Market Share of the Petitioner 
Product Name Number of 
domestic firms
Number of 
petitioners 
Share of petitioner in 
domestic production 
Tinplate 1 1 100% 
Sorbitol 70% solution  1 1 100% 
Glacial Acetic Acid 1 1 100% 
Acrylic Tow (AT) 1 1 100% 
PVC Resin (PVCR) 1 1 100% 
(UFMC) 3 1 83% 
The importer can cause material injury, if the import is highly 
concentrated. The assertion that the dominancy of only a few countries on 
the import market provides them the ability to use imports as a political 
weapon and dump imports. We can consider it as a case of sporadic 
dumping which occurs at certain points in the business cycle. Therefore, the 
first question that arises is: Was the increase in international trade evenly 
distributed across countries or has it been concentrated among a few 
countries? The second question is: In case of trade diversion does import 
concentration reduce or remain the same among the importers? 
In order to evaluate the level of concentration in total imports, we 
employed the HHI index. The results are reported in Table-3. 
Table-3: Results of HHI 
HHI 
Product/Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Tinplate  0.12 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.13* 0.20 0.14 0.13 
Sorbitol 0.62 0.62 0.69 0.48 0.45 0.31* 0.29 0.27 
GAA 0.84 0.80 0.76 0.74 0.71 0.48 0.40* 0.85 
Acrylic Tow 0 0.32 0 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.20* 0.15 
PVC Resin 0 0 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.20 0.27 0.32* 
UFMC 0.69 0.82 0.90 0.80 0.90 0.84 0.90 0.92* 
*shows antidumping duty imposition year. 
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The threshold level of HHI is 0.18. Table-3 shows that the value of 
import concentration is high, ranging from 0.12 to 0.92. This shows severe 
concentration. The import concentration ratio further increases in some 
cases after the imposition of an antidumping duty on the alleged producer, 
as obvious in the case of GAA (Galcial Acetic Acid imported from Taiwan) 
where import concentration jumped in the year of antidumping imposition, 
from 0.40 to 0.85 in the next year. This is because after the imposition of 
the antidumping duty, imports from Taiwan were reduced to zero, while 
Malaysia, another major exporter of GAA into Pakistan captured the entire 
import market of Taiwan and increased its exports to Pakistan by 50 percent 
just after the imposition of the duty. 
Strategic Industry and Antidumping 
Retaliation is a strategic reaction; therefore, it is necessary to check 
whether antidumping cases in Pakistan are of a retaliatory nature or not. 
The result shows that Pakistan’s AD cases are neither firm specific nor 
country specific. Rather, these are of ‘strategic industry specific’ nature. The 
results in Table 4 show that most of the measures taken against Pakistan are 
in the textile sector. It seems quite logical because the textile sector 
contributes 68 percent to total Pakistani exports. 
Table-4: Category Wise Division of AD Measures 
Retaliation / strategic Industry 
AD measure taken against Pakistan AD measure taken by Pakistan 
Country Category Number Country Category Number 
Egypt  Textile and 
Textile Artic 
1 South Africa Base Metal 1 
EU Textile 2 Indonesia/ 
France 
Chemical 1 
Japan Textile 1 Taiwan Chemical 1 
Peru Chemical and 
allied industries 
1 Uzbekistan Rubber / 
Plastic 
1 
South Africa Textile 1 Iran/Korea Rubber/ 
Plastic 
1 
   China Chemical 1 
Total  6   6 
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There is a clear difference in the origin of countries against whom 
measures are taken and those who take measures against Pakistan. Table-
4 shows that 50 percent of AD cases in Pakistan are in the chemical 
industry, which is a strategic industry24 and generates positive 
externalities. 
Antidumping Spread25 
AD intensity index measures how intensive Pakistan is in terms of 
AD initiation and measures, relative to its import and export share in world 
trade. AD intensity is estimated for other countries representing different 
regions and diverse economies to show how intensive Pakistan is in terms of 
AD measures and initiation relative to other countries. Table 5 shows that 
Pakistan’s AD initiation is 2.62 times more intensive as compared to its 
share of imports in the world. No doubt, the number of cases initiated by 
Pakistan is far less than the number of cases initiated by the USA. But the 
USA is a less intensive user of AD, with an index of 0.84, as compared to its 
relative share in world imports. Table 5 shows that the most intensive users 
of AD in the world are Argentina and India. 
AD intensity can be considered as a proxy for the spread of AD. The 
intensity index in Pakistan ranges from 2.6 to 3.3. This shows that AD 
spread in Pakistan is gaining momentum. If we consider the AD index of the 
USA as a standard parameter and compare other countries’ intensity value 
with the USA, we arrive at the conclusion that Pakistan is almost four times 
as intensive a user of AD measures as compared to the USA. 
                                                          
24 The sector which generates positive externalities, see e.g. Tyson (1992). 
25 Spread is wide and intensive use of AD. 
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Table-5:.Intensity Measure of AD 
Intensity Measure 2000-2005 
Country AD Initiation 
Intensity 
AD Measure’s 
Intensity 
AD Initiation 
Intensity 
AD Measure’s 
Intensity 
 Relative 
to 
import 
Relative 
to USA 
/times 
Relative 
to 
import
Relative 
to USA 
/times 
Relative 
to 
Export
Relative 
to USA 
/times 
Relative 
to 
Export 
Relative 
to USA 
/times 
Argentina 26.82 31 29 41 2.8 5.3 1.4 3.2 
Australia 4.29 5 3.3 4.7 0.67 1.2 0.50 1 
Chili 1.24 1.5 0 0 3 6 3 6.6 
China 1.40 1.6 1.15 1.6 3 6 3.3 7.3 
Egypt  7.64 9 7 10 3.3 6.3 0 0 
EU 0.75 0.86 0.67 0.95 0.12 0.23 0.12 0.26 
India  20.15 23.5 26 37 6 11 4.6 10 
Pakistan  2.62 3 3.3 4.5 2.6 5.2 2.5 5.6 
S. Africa 8.41 10 7.4 10 4 7.7 4.3 9.5 
Thailand 2.00 2.4 2.1 3 3.8 7.2 3.8 8.5 
USA 0.84 1 0.70 1 0.52 1 0.4 1 
Pakistan’s AD initiation intensity and measure intensity taken are 
2.62 and 3.3 respectively. The value of 2.6 means that Pakistan is almost a 
two and half time more severe user of antidumping as compared to its 
import share in world trade. The AD intensity index of being investigated 
for Pakistan is 2.6 and 2.5 in terms of initiation and measures. This shows 
that Pakistan has not only emerged as an intensive user of AD investigation 
but it is one of the most severe victims of AD investigation relative to its 
share of imports and exports in world trade. For this purpose we estimated 
symmetry ratios. 
Table-6 shows the symmetry ratios of AD measures and initiation. 
We divided the AD intensity index of investigation by the AD intensity 
index of being investigated which provides a value of the symmetry ratio. 
The symmetry ratio of Pakistan (1.2) shows that AD measures taken by 
Pakistan are more than AD measures taken against Pakistan. 
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Table-6: Symmetry Ratios 
Symmetry Ratio: Antidumping Initiation and Definitive Measures, 
2000-2005 
Country Measure Symmetry Initiation Symmetry 
Argentina 19.9 9.4 
Australia 6.7 6.3 
Chili 0 0.3 
China 0.34 0.4 
Egypt  0 2.2 
EU 5.5 6 
India  5.5 3.3 
Pakistan  1.2 0.98 
South Africa 1.7 2 
Thailand 0.55 0.5 
United States 1.55 6 
For Pakistan, AD initiation taken and being investigated are almost 
the same, with a symmetry ratio of 0.98. In this parameter besides India and 
Argentina, the USA also joins the race of severe investigators compared to 
being investigated. 
Trade Impact of Antidumping 
We developed a null hypothesis for total imports that the mean 
imports after AD is greater than or equal to the mean imports before AD, 
which means there is an effect of AD duty on imports. Thus the null 
hypothesis is: The mean of imports after AD duty > mean of imports before 
antidumping duty. 
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Table-7: Statistical Results of Trade Impact 
Product Total Import Named country 
import 
Non-named country 
import 
 T value Probability T value Probability T value probability 
Tinplate -3.25 0.01129 -3.36 0.0219 2.78 0.016 
Sorbitol -0.674 0.25 -5.1 0.00069 6.87 0.00012 
GAA -4.55 0.003 -7.125 0.00084 -6.045 0.0002 
Acrylic  -1.9 0.0470 -1.77 0.0681 -3.48 0.0064 
PVC Resin -1.45 0.099 -1.43 0.066 1.423 0.102 
UFMC -4.15 0.0016 -4.52 0.0016 0.55 0.314 
While looking at Table-7, and on the basis of probability and T 
values, the null hypothesis for all the products (total import) is rejected, 
except one, i.e. Sorbitol, for which the probability value is highly 
insignificant. Our alternative hypothesis is that imports after antidumping 
duties are imposed are less than the imports before antidumping duties. We 
can conclude from the significant T values and level of probability that trade 
of investigated products declined significantly in most cases after the 
imposition of AD duty. 
AD duty reduces the import of the investigated product from the 
named country. Import from non-named countries sometimes occupies the 
market of named countries after the imposition of AD duty, which is called 
trade diversion. Therefore, the null hypothesis for non-named countries is 
the opposite of the null hypothesis for named countries i.e. the sample 
mean of imports before duty is greater than or equal to the sample mean 
after duty for non-named countries.  
The value of probability in non-named countries shows that imports 
from non-named countries increased after the imposition of AD duty on the 
named countries. In two cases, i.e. PVC Resin and UFMC, imports from 
non-named countries do not increase significantly after the imposition of AD 
duty on named countries. This shows that trade in these two cases decreased 
rather than being diverted. The T test and probability value of named 
countries in Table 7 clearly show that in all cases trade was reduced 
significantly when AD duty was imposed. This result also verifies that AD 
duty imposition reduces trade and it is anti-competitive in nature. 
Ahmed Nawaz Hakro and Syed Hasanat Shah 
 
 
94 
IV. Conclusion 
The results are consistent with vast body of literature on trade 
reduction and diversion after the imposition of AD duty. An economic 
rationale has been followed in half of the cases in imposing AD duty by 
Pakistan. Despite a small number of cases, Pakistan emerged as one of the 
most important AD users on the basis of AD use relative to total import 
share. Resultantly, intensive use of AD reduced trade and increased the 
trade barriers, which could lead to a reduction in economic gains, but 
fortunately, trade diversion reduces the chances of trade reduction in 
Pakistan. This suggests that AD measures simply reduced imports from 
targeted countries without any substantial effect. The key message that has 
emerged out of this research is that trade diversion persists in the case of 
Pakistan. In some cases, trade diversion is substantial and offsets the effect 
of AD measures on named countries to the benefit of non-named 
countries. 
Evidence presented in this paper indicates that the political economy 
argument is the strongest one in explaining Pakistan’s AD actions. AD 
actions protect the highly concentrated industries. In recent years, many 
observers have begun to note the proliferation of AD measures and the 
possibility that the established users of this trade policy instrument are 
being retaliated against. But retaliation (strategic trade policy) seems to play 
no role in the AD cases of Pakistan. 
Results also demonstrate that the AD intensity of Pakistan is 
significantly high as compared to its share in world imports. Intensive AD 
use can be justified, if it follows an economic rationale, such as: anti-
predation, strategic trade policy and political economy arguments. 
The most frequently offered justification for AD is the prevention of 
predation. Pakistan’s AD enforcement has clearly not addressed predation 
issues. This result is the same as has been found for US AD cases (Shin 
1998). The procedure which has been followed in this study for the 
predation test shows that the necessary conditions for predatory pricing 
exist, because firms have a large market share. 
One can conclude that antidumping policies which are designed to 
ensure fair competition and improve economic efficiency may in fact reduce 
fair competition in the case of Pakistan. 
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Appendix-A 
The History of AD cases in Pakistan 
S.No 1 2 3 4 5 6 
H.S Code 7210.1200 2905.4400 
&3824.6000
2915.2100 5501.3000 3904.1000 3909.1010 
Custom Duty 25% 25% 25% 20% 25% 25% 
Product Tinplate Sorbitol Oil GAA Acrylic Tow PVC Resin Urea 
Name of 
Applicant 
M/s Siddiq 
Sons 
Tinplate 
(Pvt) Ltd. 
Karachi 
M/s Habib 
Arkady (Pvt) 
Ltd, Karachi
M/s Wah 
Nobel 
Acetates 
Ltd 
M/s Dewan 
Salman 
Fibre Ltd 
Engro sahi 
Ploymers 
and 
Chemicals 
Ltd 
Dynea 
Pakistan 
Ltd 
Date of 
Initiation 
26-02-
2002 
06-03-2003 03-09-2003 17-03-2004 25-06-2004 12-01-
2005 
Exporters Mac Steel .Roquette 
Freres, 
.P.T Sorini 
Corp  
Chan Chun 
Petrro-
Chemical 
Co. Ltd 
Pumice 
Trading Co  
East Sea 
Sail Co.  
Pouya 
Tarabar 
Naviy Azot 
LG Internat: 
Corporation, 
Iran Petro-
chemical  
Bluestar 
Sinochem  
Yixing  
Origin of 
Export 
South 
Africa  
France  
Indonesia  
Taiwan Uzbekistan South Korea  
Iran 
China 
Dumping 
Margin 
39.32% 96.50% and 
22.26% for 
Franc and 
Indonesia 
respectively 
13.77% 12.71% 40.18%  & 
31.06% for 
Korea and 
Iran 
respective: 
10% 
Imposition 
Date of 
Provisional 
Duty  
22-07-
2002 
19-07-2003 18-06-2004 10-12-2004 24-02-2005 18-07-
2005 
Provisional 
Duty at the 
rate of 
23.91% 96.50% on 
France &  
91.12% on 
Indonesia 
13.77% 12.71% 40.18% on 
Korea and 
31.06% on 
Iran 
10%  
Imposition 
Date of 
Definitive 
duty 
26-11-
2002 
19-11-2003 18-06-2004 10-12-2004 24-02-2005 18-07-
2005 
Definitive 
Duty at the 
rate of 
 
27.33% 
 
96.50% on 
France 
22.3% on 
Indonesia 
13.77% 12.71% 40.18% on 
Korea 
36.01% on 
Iran 
10% 
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